一、题目：

Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat

二、主讲人：

刘烁

三、摘要：

We consider the design of contests when the principal can choose both the prize profile and how the prizes are allocated as a function of a possibly noisy signal about the agents’efforts. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee optimality of a contest. Optimal contests have a minimally competitive prize profile and an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function. Whenever observation is not too noisy, the optimum can be achieved by an all-pay auction with a cap. When observation is perfect, the optimum can also be achieved by a nested Tullock contest. We relate our results to a recent literature which has asked similar questions but has typically focused on the design of either the prize profile or the contest success function.

四、主讲人简介：

刘烁，北京大学光华管理学院应用经济学系助理教授。2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获博士学位。目前主要研究领域为产业与组织经济学、博弈论以及机制设计理论。研究成果发表于国际学术期刊，如Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review等。目前主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“市场竞争与有限理性消费者”，并参与重大项目“数字经济反垄断理论与政策研究”。

五、邀请人：

徐进 数学学院副研究员

六、时间：

11月9日（周三）19:00-20:00

七、地点：

腾讯会议

八、联系人：

陈小聪，联系方式：1274348886@qq.com

九、主办：

山东大学数学学院