一、报告题目

Regulator Supervisory Power and Bank Loan Contracting

二、报告人

澳大利亚国立大学 张乐

三、报告时间

12月26日 （周四） 下午15:00-16:30

四、报告地点

中心校区知新楼B423

五、报告人简介

Le Zhang is Senior Lecturer of Finance at the Australian National University. He works at the intersection of corporate finance, investment, and political economy, with a focus on understanding how the frictions in financial market and institutions influence the corporate decision making. His research has won Pearson Prize for the Best Paper in Financial Management and has been published in top academic journals such as the Review of Financial Studies and Journal of Financial Intermediation. He teaches corporate finance for undergraduate, postgraduate, MBA, and Executive MBA program.

六、报告摘要

Using a large sample from 39 countries, we examine the link between a regulator’s supervisory power and bank loan contracting. We find that loans issued by banks that operate under more powerful supervisors have a higher spread, smaller size and shorter maturity. Moreover, these loans are more likely to have covenants and collateral requirements. Importantly, our findings are more pronounced for firms with higher credit risk. Tests based on instrumental variables and country fixed effects regressions provide confirming evidence of a causal link. Overall, these results suggest that a regulator’s supervisory power is an important determinant of banks’ risk-taking in their lending activities.

七、主办单位

山东大学经济学院